



THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHENOMENON OF GENIUS: A SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

Renaissance University
Associate Professor of the
Department of “Socio-Political Sciences”

Fozilov Golibjon Nabijonovich

golibjonf1@gmail.com

94 944 44 40

Annotation. *This article examines the evolution of the phenomenon of genius from scientific and philosophical perspectives. The study analyzes the historical transformation of ideas about genius, from ancient metaphysical interpretations to modern neuropsychological and sociocultural approaches. Particular attention is given to the interaction between heredity, environment, creativity, and cognitive processes in the formation of genius. The article also explores the contributions of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence studies to understanding extraordinary intellectual and creative abilities. The author argues that genius should be interpreted as a multidimensional phenomenon shaped by biological predisposition, social conditions, and innovative consciousness. Furthermore, the paper highlights the significance of interdisciplinary research in revealing the mechanisms underlying exceptional human potential in the XXI century.*

Keywords: *Genius phenomenon, creativity, intellectual evolution, heredity, social environment, innovative thinking, cognitive processes, philosophy of genius, neuroscience, creative consciousness, exceptional abilities, divergent thinking, scientific creativity, artificial intelligence, human potential.*



Introduction: The Persistent Mystery. Few concepts in intellectual history have proven as durable and as resistant to clean definition as *genius*. It names something that nearly everyone recognises — the almost physical shock of encountering the work of Einstein, Mozart, Shakespeare, or Curie — but that no single discipline has managed to fully explain. Physics, genetics, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and the history of ideas have each illuminated a facet; none has captured the whole.¹

The twentieth century was both the golden age of genius — an unprecedented concentration of world-transforming intellects — and the era in which the concept itself was most radically interrogated. Darwin's revolution had handed science the tools to study human variation systematically. Freud proposed that the unconscious, not the will, powered the deepest creative acts. Behaviourists denied innate differences in capacity altogether. Sociologists argued that genius was, in the end, a social attribution — a label applied selectively by communities with specific interests. Meanwhile, neuroscience began to map the actual physical correlates of exceptional cognition, raising the disturbing possibility that what we call inspiration might be, at its foundation, a matter of synaptic architecture.²

This article traces the evolution of the *idea* of genius from its earliest philosophical formulations through to the multi-disciplinary debates of the present, anchoring the argument throughout in the concrete cases of five individuals whose lives and work defined the twentieth century's relationship to exceptional achievement. The aim is neither to celebrate nor to demystify genius but to understand it more honestly — as a phenomenon that is at once biological, psychological, historical, and social, and that cannot be reduced to any one of these registers without distortion.

The etymological root of the English word *genius* is the Latin noun of the same form — a tutelary spirit, the animating force that accompanied a Roman male from birth, guiding his choices and embodying his generative



power. The Greek cognate, *daimōn*, carried comparable metaphysical weight: Socrates famously described his inner voice as a daimonion, a divine sign that warned but never compelled.³ In both traditions, exceptional creative power was understood as arriving from *outside* the individual — as visitation rather than possession.

Plato articulated the classical statement of this view in the *Ion* and the *Phaedrus*. The poet, Socrates argues, composes not by skill or knowledge but by divine inspiration, becoming an instrument through which the Muse speaks: "a holy thing, and...not in their right mind when they make their beautiful poems."⁴ The paradox is deliberate: the creative product is elevated precisely because it exceeds the individual who produced it.

"The poet is a holy thing, and not in their right mind when they make their beautiful poems — not by art but by divine dispensation."

The Renaissance reinterpreted this inheritance without abandoning its essentials. Marsilio Ficino, working in the Florentine circle of Lorenzo de' Medici, adapted the Neoplatonic concept of *furor divinus* — divine frenzy — to account for the polymath achievements of contemporaries like Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo. Genius was still a gift from above, but it was now a gift to a specific kind of person: one born under the planet Saturn, melancholic in temperament, capable of the extremes of both torpor and inspired flight.⁵ The "Saturnine genius" became a cultural archetype that would prove extraordinarily persistent, resonating even in twentieth-century debates about the relationship between creativity and psychopathology.

The Enlightenment secularised the concept without fully naturalising it. Kant, in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790), defined genius as "the talent that gives the rule to art" — an innate mental disposition through which nature prescribes its law to art — and insisted that genius could not be taught or transmitted, only exercised and exemplified.⁶ For Kant, genius was irreducibly



individual and irreducibly mysterious: the genius himself could not explain how he did what he did.

Romanticism amplified this mystery into a metaphysics of creative individuality. The Romantic genius — Goethe's Werther, Byron's Harold, Beethoven as interpreted by E.T.A. Hoffmann — was not merely unusually gifted but ontologically different from ordinary humanity: a Promethean figure standing against convention, tormented by his own supersensitivity, and paying for his gifts with suffering. This Romantic model shaped popular understanding well into the twentieth century and still structures the cultural imagination around figures like Van Gogh, Kafka, or Turing.⁷

The decisive rupture with the philosophical tradition came in 1869 with the publication of Francis Galton's *Hereditary Genius*. Darwin's cousin applied the newly available tools of statistical analysis to a question that had previously been the domain of biography and metaphysics: do exceptional abilities run in families, and if so, by what mechanism?⁸ Galton's answer was unambiguous and provocative — genius was largely inherited, distributed in the population according to a normal curve, and identifiable through the study of "natural ability" as expressed in eminent achievement across generations.

Normal distribution of ability
Regression to the mean
Heritability of eminence
Twin comparison method
Biographical prosopography
Eugenics programme
Nature vs. nurture debate

Galton's methods were crude by modern standards — he used eminence, defined as professional reputation surviving at least one generation, as his dependent variable, and he could not control for the obvious confound that families also transmit educational resources, social networks, and cultural expectations alongside their genes. But his framing of genius as a proper subject for natural science was genuinely revolutionary, and the basic questions he posed — how heritable are cognitive abilities? what is the relationship between



biological endowment and social circumstance? — remain the animating questions of the field to this day.⁹

The early twentieth century saw the development of psychometric intelligence testing as the apparent instrument Galton's programme needed. Alfred Binet's 1905 scale, designed to identify Parisian schoolchildren who needed additional support, was rapidly transformed by Henry Goddard and Lewis Terman in the United States into a general measure of fixed, innate intelligence.¹⁰ Terman's landmark "Genetic Studies of Genius," begun in 1921 and tracking 1,528 California children with IQ scores above 135, was the most ambitious attempt in history to study the development of gifted individuals longitudinally. Its findings were, in retrospect, as illuminating for what they failed to find as for what they found: the "Termites," as the cohort came to be called, achieved distinguished careers in above-average proportion — but produced remarkably few transformative geniuses. Two children Terman screened out as insufficiently gifted went on to win Nobel Prizes: William Shockley (co-inventor of the transistor) and Luis Alvarez.¹¹

"Intelligence and achievement are far from perfectly correlated." The lesson was uncomfortable for the psychometric programme: IQ, whatever it measured, was not a sufficient condition for genius. The missing variables — personality, motivation, circumstance, the specific match between a person's abilities and the demands of a historical moment — were not captured by any existing scale. As Dean Keith Simonton would later demonstrate through historiometric analysis of thousands of eminent historical figures, genius operates in a probabilistic, multiply-determined space that resists reduction to any single parameter.¹²

Where the psychometric tradition sought to measure genius from the outside — through scores, rankings, and familial genealogies — the psychoanalytic tradition, inaugurated by Freud and diversified by Adler, Jung, and their successors, sought to understand it from the inside, as the expression



of unconscious dynamics that the creative individual could not fully control or comprehend.

Freud's short essay "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming" (1908) proposed that artistic creation, like dreaming, was a form of wish-fulfilment — the socially acceptable reworking of infantile desires and unresolved conflicts into forms that others could enjoy.¹³ His longer study *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910) extended this framework to explain Leonardo's notoriously unfinished projects: the scientist's insatiable curiosity, Freud argued, was a sublimated version of the childhood sexual curiosity that had been repressed when the young Leonardo was separated from his biological mother.¹⁴ The argument was, as contemporaries immediately noted, both brilliant and methodologically fraught — built on a single mistranslated childhood memory and a highly speculative reconstruction of early emotional life.

The more durable psychoanalytic contribution to the theory of genius came through the concept of *regression in service of the ego*, developed by Ernst Kris in 1952.¹⁵ Kris proposed that creative individuals have a distinctive capacity to allow primary-process thinking — the associative, image-rich, non-logical mode of the unconscious — to surface under controlled conditions, harnessing its generative power while retaining enough ego-strength to shape the results into communicable form. This formulation anticipated later cognitive models of creative insight: the ability to lower the threshold between conscious and unconscious processing, to tolerate ambiguity and absurdity without being overwhelmed by them.

Jung's concept of the "creative complex" — a relatively autonomous psychic entity that periodically seizes the ego and compels expression — gave philosophical depth to artists' recurring experience of creative compulsion.¹⁶ More influentially for the study of the twentieth century's scientific geniuses, Alfred Adler's theory of inferiority compensation suggested that many high



achievers were driven by an early experience of inadequacy — physical weakness, social marginalisation, or developmental delay — that generated a compensatory drive toward mastery and superiority. The biographies of Einstein (who was slow to speak as a child), Tesla (who suffered from vivid and frightening hallucinations), and Curie (who grew up under Russian occupation, excluded from university education) offer suggestive, if not conclusive, evidence for this model.¹⁷

The cognitive-scientific approach to genius, emerging in the 1970s and accelerating with the development of neuroimaging technologies in the 1990s, has moved the discussion away from psychodynamics and toward the study of the information-processing systems that underlie exceptional performance. Three questions have dominated this research programme: Is there a distinctive neural architecture associated with genius? What cognitive processes are most characteristic of creative and scientific breakthroughs? And what is the relationship between deliberate practice and innate endowment?

The neurological study of genius was placed on an empirical footing — however contested — by the post-mortem examination of Albert Einstein's brain, preserved by pathologist Thomas Harvey following Einstein's death in 1955. Analyses conducted over subsequent decades identified several structural anomalies: an unusual expansion of the inferior parietal region (associated with mathematical and spatial reasoning), a distinctive morphology of the Sylvian fissure, and an elevated glial-to-neuron ratio in certain cortical areas.¹⁸ The difficulty with interpreting these findings is fundamental: it is impossible to determine whether the structural differences caused Einstein's exceptional abilities or whether they resulted from decades of intense mathematical work reshaping the brain through experience-dependent plasticity — the phenomenon of neuroplasticity now well-established in the scientific literature.¹⁹



Greater long-range cortical connectivity Neural efficiency (lower metabolic cost per task) Enhanced default-mode/executive network integration Larger working memory capacity Reduced latent inhibition in creative individuals Faster axonal conduction velocity Greater synaptic plasticity

The "neural efficiency" hypothesis, developed by Richard Haier and colleagues in the 1980s using PET imaging, proposed that more intelligent individuals solve cognitive tasks with *less* metabolic activity — their brains do more with less.²⁰ Subsequent fMRI research complicated this picture considerably: neural efficiency appears to apply to routine tasks within a person's zone of mastery, while genuinely novel problems recruit additional neural resources even in highly capable individuals. The real distinction may be less about raw processing power than about the architecture of connectivity: research on the "parieto-frontal integration" network suggests that the critical variable is the quality of information routing between specialised brain regions, rather than the raw capacity of any individual area.²¹

Perhaps the most influential — and most debated — contribution of cognitive science to the study of genius was K. Anders Ericsson's programme of research on expertise and deliberate practice. Ericsson's studies of violinists at the Berlin Hochschule für Musik, conducted in collaboration with Ralf Krampe and Clemens Tesch-Römer and published in 1993, provided evidence that the accumulated hours of *deliberate practice* — effortful, focused, structured work at the edge of current ability, with immediate corrective feedback — predicted expert performance more reliably than any measured talent indicator.²²

Malcolm Gladwell's popularisation of this research as the "ten-thousand-hour rule" in *Outliers* (2008) generated enormous public interest and, subsequently, a significant critical backlash.²³ Meta-analyses by Brooke Macnamara and colleagues found that deliberate practice explained a much smaller proportion of variance in performance than Ericsson's original claims



implied — approximately 12% in sports, 21% in music — and that the unexplained variance was likely accounted for by genetic and other individual-difference factors.²⁴ More pointedly, critics noted that the framework assumed equal access to quality practice opportunities — an assumption that spectacularly failed to account for the role of class, geography, and institutional support in determining who gets the coaching, the time, and the feedback that deliberate practice requires.

"What distinguishes experts from novices is not innate talent so much as the amount and quality of deliberate practice they have accumulated."

Against both the psychometric and the cognitive-scientific traditions, which tend to locate genius within the individual — in a genome, a neural architecture, or a pattern of practice — sociological and critical-theoretical approaches insist that genius is, in essential respects, a social phenomenon: a label, a status, an attribution, whose assignment is governed by power relations as much as by intrinsic achievement.²⁵

Randall Collins's monumental sociology of philosophy, *The Sociology of Philosophies* (1998), demonstrated that virtually every major philosopher in history was embedded in dense networks of face-to-face intellectual interaction — what Collins called "interaction ritual chains" — and that the geographical and temporal clustering of great philosophers was explicable by the distribution and intensity of these networks rather than by any random variation in biological endowment.²⁶ The Athens of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the Vienna Circle; the Bloomsbury Group; the Manhattan Project — each constituted a "node" of unusually dense intellectual interaction that generated intellectual productivity far beyond what random sampling of the population would predict.

Pierre Bourdieu's field theory adds a further dimension: intellectual and artistic "fields" are sites of struggle for symbolic capital — recognition, prestige, the power to define what counts as significant — and "genius" is a



form of symbolic capital whose accumulation follows the same winner-take-all dynamics as other forms of capital in a market economy.²⁷ Robert Merton's "Matthew Effect" in science — "to him who hath shall be given" — documented the systematic tendency for early recognition to generate further recognition independently of subsequent work, so that the attribution of genius, once established, becomes self-reinforcing regardless of comparative merit.²⁸

Feminist scholars, from Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* (1929) onward, have insisted on the most fundamental social dimension of genius: the systematic exclusion of women from the institutions and opportunities through which genius is produced and recognised.²⁹ Woolf's devastating thought experiment — imagining Shakespeare's equally gifted sister, condemned by her sex to obscurity and death — was not merely rhetorical. The twentieth century provided extensive empirical confirmation: Lise Meitner, co-discoverer of nuclear fission, was excluded from the Nobel Prize awarded to her male collaborator Otto Hahn; Rosalind Franklin's X-ray crystallography was essential to Watson, Crick, and Wilkins's Nobel-winning model of DNA, but she died before the award and received no share of it.³⁰ These cases testify that the distribution of genius recognition reflects the distribution of power as much as the distribution of ability.

Marie Curie's career offers the starkest illustration of the feminist critique of genius as a social category. Born Maria Skłodowska in Warsaw in 1867, under Russian imperial occupation that denied Polish women access to universities, she received her early education through the clandestine "Flying University" and emigrated to Paris to study at the Sorbonne — one of the very few European institutions that admitted women.³⁴

Her scientific genius was of a particular kind: the capacity for systematic, exhaustive, physically demanding empirical investigation sustained over years — sifting tonnes of pitchblende to isolate the first samples of polonium and radium — combined with the conceptual audacity to propose that radioactivity



was an atomic property, not a chemical reaction, at a time when the atom's internal structure was wholly unknown.³⁵ Curie's refusal of a chair at the Sorbonne (on the grounds that it had never been held by a woman and that she would rather earn it through scientific achievement than accept it as a courtesy) and the French Academy of Sciences' refusal to elect her despite her double Nobel Prize illustrate precisely how the structural attribution of genius operates through gendered exclusions.³⁶

Alan Turing's case illustrates the relationship between genius, marginality, and catastrophic social violence with particular force. His 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers" invented the conceptual machine that now bears his name — a thought experiment that provided the mathematical foundations for all subsequent computational theory — before electronic computers existed.³⁷ His wartime work at Bletchley Park on the German Enigma and Lorenz ciphers shortened the Second World War by an estimated two to four years and saved millions of lives.³⁸

In 1952, Turing was prosecuted under Victorian statutes criminalising homosexuality, subjected to chemical castration as an alternative to imprisonment, and stripped of his security clearance. He died in 1954, almost certainly by suicide, at the age of forty-one. The philosophy of science raises a haunting counter-factual: what would the subsequent development of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and mathematical biology have produced had Turing's career not been truncated? His 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" — which introduced the "imitation game" later known as the Turing test — revealed a mind at the beginning of its most ambitious phase of work.³⁹

John von Neumann is the closest approach to Galton's fantasy of measurable superior intellect that the twentieth century produced. Colleagues who were themselves among the most brilliant minds of the era — Eugene Wigner, Paul Halmos, Hans Bethe, Norbert Wiener — consistently reported



that von Neumann's mind operated at a speed and depth qualitatively different from their own.⁴⁰ He could perform long mental calculations at the speed of a mechanical calculator; he could reproduce verbatim text he had read years earlier; he solved problems during conversations that others would have required days of desk work to approach.

What is theoretically interesting about von Neumann is not just the raw processing power but the application of a unified mathematical sensibility across radically different domains — quantum mechanics, economics, meteorology, nuclear weapons design, and the architecture of electronic computers — such that insights from each domain fertilised the others. This "conceptual transfer" across domains is one of the markers that most consistently distinguishes transformative genius from high expertise within a single field.⁴¹ The social conditions of his genius are equally significant: the Hungarian Jewish bourgeoisie of the early twentieth century invested extraordinary resources in elite education; the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton provided institutional conditions — freedom from teaching, proximity to Einstein and Gödel, access to military and government problems — uniquely suited to this style of polymathic work.

Picasso's case raises the question of whether the concept of genius applies with equal validity across scientific and artistic domains, and if so, what structural features they share. Picasso's early technical mastery — his ability to produce academically accomplished figurative work before adolescence — is well-documented and has led some commentators to read his subsequent radical departures as wilful iconoclasm rather than genuine innovation.⁴² This reading misunderstands the logic of artistic genius.

The fundamental innovation of Cubism was conceptual rather than technical: the proposition that a painting need not represent the visual experience of a single observer at a single moment in time, but could simultaneously present multiple perspectives, temporal moments, and spatial



positions — a form of pictorial thinking that has obvious analogies to Einsteinian relativity and to the emerging concerns of modern philosophy with the perspectival character of all knowledge.⁴³ The decisive catalyst was the encounter with African sculpture at the Trocadéro ethnographic museum in 1907, which showed Picasso a mode of representation that was simultaneously formal, expressive, and indifferent to naturalistic illusionism. Without that cross-cultural collision — made possible by European colonial collecting — Cubism is difficult to imagine.⁴⁴ Genius, here as elsewhere, emerges at the intersection of individual capacity and historical accident.

The survey of theoretical frameworks and biographical cases undertaken in the preceding sections suggests that no single explanatory model is adequate to the phenomenon of genius, but that the various models are not simply incommensurable — they address different dimensions of a multiply-determined process. The following principles represent an attempt at provisional synthesis.

No contemporary treatment of the evolution of the genius concept can avoid the challenge posed by artificial intelligence — not merely as a practical tool but as a philosophical provocation. If a machine can solve mathematical problems that defeated the best human mathematicians, compose music indistinguishable from the work of masters, and generate scientific hypotheses that lead to novel experimental discoveries, what remains distinctively human about genius?⁴⁶

The achievements of contemporary AI systems — AlphaFold's protein structure predictions, which solved a problem that had occupied structural biologists for fifty years; large language models capable of passing graduate-level examinations across multiple disciplines — force a distinction between two things that had previously seemed inseparable: the *product* of genius and the *process* of genius. AI systems can produce genius-level products without undergoing anything resembling the lived experience of creative struggle —



the years of failed experiments, the psychological cost of marginality and misunderstanding, the specific biographical trajectory — that characterise the human genius.⁴⁷

This distinction may itself illuminate what was most philosophically significant about human genius all along. The twentieth century's great figures were not interesting merely because they solved problems — they were interesting because they *found* the problems: they noticed, against the grain of established assumption, that certain questions had not been asked, that certain anomalies had been explained away rather than explained, that certain boundaries between disciplines were conventional rather than natural. Einstein did not merely solve the equations of special relativity — he noticed that there was a fundamental tension between classical mechanics and electrodynamics that everyone else had missed.⁴⁸ Turing did not merely design computers — he asked whether a machine could think, when the question itself was considered meaningless. It is this capacity for what the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein might have called "seeing-as" — perceiving a situation under a new description that reorganises what counts as relevant — that current AI systems most conspicuously lack, and that seems most distinctively characteristic of the geniuses who transformed the twentieth century.⁴⁹

Conclusion. The evolution of the concept of genius from Plato's *Ion* to contemporary cognitive neuroscience is not simply a story of progressive scientific enlightenment — of myth giving way, step by step, to empirical fact. It is, rather, a story of successive partial illuminations, each revealing aspects of the phenomenon that previous frameworks had occluded, and each generating its own characteristic blind spots. The ancient view of genius as divine visitation captured the phenomenology of creative inspiration — the genuine sense, reported by many geniuses, that their best ideas came to them rather than from them — while missing the biological and developmental processes that make such experiences possible in some minds and not others.



Galton's statistical approach revealed the heritability of exceptional ability while obscuring the social determinants of its expression and recognition. Psychoanalysis opened the unconscious dimension of creativity while producing untestable speculations about specific biographical causes. Cognitive science specified the information-processing architecture of expertise while underestimating the role of intrinsic motivation, cross-domain thinking, and historical context. Sociology corrected the individualism of all preceding approaches while risking the dissolution of the phenomenon into its social conditions.

What remains, after this survey, is not a neat synthesis but a properly complex picture: genius is real — the differences in achievement between Einstein and a competent physicist, between Curie and a diligent chemist, between Turing and a skilled mathematician, are not merely artefacts of social attribution — but it is irreducibly multi-determined, emerging from the interaction of biological endowment, cognitive style, personality structure, developmental history, institutional context, intellectual community, and historical moment in ways that resist complete formalisation.

The most important practical implication of this complex picture may be the least comfortable: the vast majority of human genius is never recognised, and a substantial proportion of it is never even expressed, because the social conditions for its development and reception are not available to those who possess the relevant biological and psychological potentials. The twenty-first century's most urgent task, in this domain as in others, may be not the identification of genius but the creation of conditions under which the full range of human potential — across all geographies, all genders, all social classes — can find the developmental support, the institutional frameworks, and the intellectual communities that genius requires. The history of the twentieth century's greatest minds is, in the end, an argument for the radical expansion of possibility, not merely its celebration.



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35. Curie, M. (1904). Radioactive Substances. *Chemical News*, 88. Curie's doctoral thesis, defended in 1903, contains the original argument that radioactivity is an atomic phenomenon — one of the most significant single documents in the history of physics.
36. Crawford, E. (1996). *Nationalism and Internationalism in Science, 1880–1939*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 141–178. On the political dimensions of Nobel Prize attribution and the exclusion of Curie from the French Academy.
37. Turing, A. M. (1936). On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society*, 2(42), 230–265. This paper, written when Turing was twenty-three, introduced



both the concept of the Universal Turing Machine and the proof that certain mathematical questions are undecidable.

38. Hodges, A. (1983). *Alan Turing: The Enigma*. Simon & Schuster. pp. 312–350. The estimate of two to four years reduction in the war's duration is based on analysis by historians of cryptography and military strategy.

39. Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence. *Mind*, 59(236), 433–460. The paper opens with the disarming question: "I propose to consider the question, 'Can machines think?'" — a question that remains unresolved seventy-five years later.

40. Macrae, N. (1992). *John von Neumann: The Scientific Genius Who Pioneered the Modern Computer, Game Theory, Nuclear Deterrence, and Much More*. Pantheon Books. pp. 1–52. The testimony of colleagues is particularly well-documented here; Wigner described von Neumann's mind as "so far superior to any other I have known that it is almost a difference in kind as well as degree."

41. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). *Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention*. HarperCollins. pp. 53–76. On "cross-domain" thinking as a distinguishing characteristic of transformative creative work.

42. Richardson, J. (1991). *A Life of Picasso: The Prodigy, 1881–1906*. Random House. pp. 15–65. Picasso's father, an academic painter, reportedly gave his son his own brushes and declared that he would paint no more, acknowledging that the thirteen-year-old had surpassed him.

43. Henderson, L. D. (1983). *The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art*. Princeton University Press. pp. 39–93. On the relationship between Cubism and contemporary developments in mathematics and physics.

44. Rubin, W. (Ed.). (1984). "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern. Museum of Modern Art. Vol. 1, pp. 241–343. Picasso later described the encounter at the Trocadéro as an "epiphany" and



connected it explicitly to the decision to rework the faces in Les Demoiselles d'Avignon.

45. Dewey, J. (1938). *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. Henry Holt. pp. 280–310. Dewey's concept of "qualitative novelty" — properties emerging at higher levels of organisation that cannot be predicted from lower-level analysis — provides a philosophical framework for understanding genius as emergent rather than reducible.

46. Marcus, G., & Davis, E. (2019). *Rebooting AI: Building Artificial Intelligence We Can Trust*. Pantheon Books. pp. 1–52. For a sceptical assessment of current AI capabilities relative to human cognition.

47. Floridi, L. (2014). *The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality*. Oxford University Press. pp. 74–112. On the distinction between producing intelligent outputs and possessing intelligence as a process.

48. Holton, G. (1973). *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein*. Harvard University Press. pp. 167–239. Holton's analysis of Einstein's scientific papers identifies the "themata" — persistent conceptual commitments — that structured his perception of anomalies and led him to formulate questions that other physicists had not posed.

49. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell. §§ 193–197. Wittgenstein's analysis of "seeing-as" — perceiving a figure now as a duck, now as a rabbit — is a useful model for the cognitive shift involved in genuinely novel intellectual framing.